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Abstract
In many diagnosis-and-repair domains, diagnostic
reasoning cannot be abstracted from repair actions,
nor from actions necessary to obtain diagnostic in-
formation. In general, in exploratory-corrective
domains an agent has to interleave exploratory ac-
tivity with activity aimed at achieving its goals.
In TraumAID 2.0, a consultation system for multi-
ple trauma management, we implement a reasoning
framework for such domains which integrates di-
agnostic reasoning with planning and action. This
paper presents Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD), a
formalization of TraumAID 2.0’s diagnostic rea-
soning. Taking the view that a diagnosis is only
worthwhile to the extent that it can affect repair de-
cisions, GDD uses goals to focus on such. Goals
are also useful as a means of communicating with
its accompanying planner.
1 Background and Motivation
In many domains, it is common to distinguish reasoning and
activity concerned with what problems need be addressed
from that reasoning concerned with how to address those prob-
lems. As such, Artificial Intelligence (AI) subsumes as sepa-
rate sub-disciplines diagnosis research, seeking the source (or
sources) of a system’s faulty behavior, and planning research,
concerned with the construction of action plans to achieve
certain goals. Based on that dichotomy, most formalizations
of diagnosis aim at a diagnosis object as a solution.
In some domains, however, this may be inadequate. In
trauma management, for one, therapy is the ultimate objective
and diagnosis is the “price” that one has to pay in order to
achieve that objective. In such domains, we argue, diagnosis
should only persist so long as it can affect those decisions
for which it was carried out in the first place, namely repair
decisions. We call this the Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD)
principle.
The GDD principle suggests that diagnostic and therapeu-
tic decisions be considered together. Furthermore, in many
diagnosis-and-repair domains multiple diagnostic and thera-
peutic needs require, and compete for, the agent’s activity. In
 This work was supported in part by a graduate fellowship,
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[Rymon, 93], we propose an Exploratory-Corrective Manage-
ment (ECM) architecture (Figure 1) employing a basic cycle
of diagnostic reasoning, planning and action.
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Figure 1: The ECM Architecture
In this architecture, diagnostic and therapeutic goals are
uniformly posted to the planner, who is charged with ad-
dressing them as a combination. For exploratory-corrective
domains such as trauma management, the ECM architecture
satisfies the following desiderata:
1. it allows interleaving diagnosis and repair.
2. it positions the diagnostic reasoner to
(a) set diagnostic and therapeutic goals;
(b) use incoming evidence to monitor actions and other
events, reason about changes in knowledge or state,
and adapt goals;
3. it positions the planner to mediate between concurrent
diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
TraumAID is a consultation system for the diagnosis and
treatment of multiple trauma (for an overview see [Webber
et al., 92]). TraumAID 2.0, its new ECM-based version,
has recently been judged by a panel of trauma surgeons as
significantly more acceptable than actual care.1. This paper
formalizes TraumAID 2.0’s goal-directed diagnostic reason-
ing. It is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related
work; Section 3 formalizes GDD; and Section 4 discusses
its use within the ECM framework to implement a variety of
diagnosis-and-repair strategies.
1Three trauma surgeons were asked to blindly compare the actual
care in 97 trauma cases to the management that would have been
proposed by TraumAID 2.0. The judges indicated a significant
preference for TraumAID 2.0 plans over actual plans by a ratio of 64
to 17 with 16 ties (p  0.001 by binomial test). For more details see
[Rymon, 93].
2 Related Work
2.1 Formalizations of diagnosis
Recent years have seen significant advances in formal ap-
proaches to diagnosis. A large number of approaches and
frameworks have been suggested: probabilistic classifiers
and discriminators, logical consistency-based and abductive
paradigms, graph-based formulations in which causal and co-
incidental relations are modeled, etc. What is common, how-
ever, to all these formalizations is that they take a diagnosis
object – broadly defined as a characterization of the current
state of affairs – as a solution and therefore as their goal. Our
Goal-Directed Diagnostic paradigm takes a different view of
diagnosis and its objectives: recommendations are impor-
tant!.
To understand this view, consider first that diagnosis is
rarely an independent task, but rather serves the purpose of
another process, e.g. repair. With incomplete information,
general theories of diagnosis will often give rise to a large
number of hypothetical diagnoses. As it often happens, many
of these are irrelevant. Their computation, and the need on
the part of the matrix process to sort through them, are thus a
waste.
An important observation made by Poole and Provan [90]
is that the optimality of a diagnosis must depend on post-
diagnosis goals. To that end, they advocate the use of utilities
[91b]; in [91a] they further note that there is often no need for
a complete explanation and that the granularity of a solution
again depends on its uses (and also on available tests).
In some domains, explicitly specified utilities can be used
to reflect issues of importance to the matrix process in diag-
nostic process decisions. However, while utility-theory sees
increased use in Artificial Intelligence in general and medi-
cal decision making in particular, it also requires a level of
completeness and precision in characterizing a domain that
is sometimes hard to obtain and may not be available. The
GDD principle can be viewed as a qualitative analogue of
a utility-maximization principle. The GDD framework sup-
ports the implementation of this principle in ECM agents by
explicitly representing and reasoning about goals. In particu-
lar, alternative actions are being ruled in or out according to
direct and indirect (i.e. through action) goal interactions, e.g.
suppression, subsumption, compatibility, preferences, etc.
In exploratory-corrective domains, it is often hard to sepa-
rate diagnosis from repair. The GDD paradigm is thus part of
a total approach for reasoning which combines diagnostic rea-
soning, planning and action. Friedrich et al. [91] and Sun and
Weld [92] share much of this view. Considering diagnosis as
part of an overall diagnosis-and-repair process, Friedrich et al.
note that repair does not always require a complete diagnostic
explanation. Unlike other formalizations, their theory has no
explicit notion of a diagnosis object. Instead, a sequence of
tests and repair actions is sought, that if applied to the current
state, will imply (as in a logical proof) a restoration of the diag-
nosed system to a proper working condition. Presented not as
a theory of diagnosis but as a theory of repair planning, their
work applies a possible-models planning approach [Winslett,
88] to a diagnostic domain. Friedrich and Nejdl [92] de-
scribe a set of algorithms for diagnosis-and-repair plans. Sun
and Weld use UWL, a STRIPS-like language, in an approach
which integrates GDE-style diagnosis and STRIPS-style plan-
ning. The link between diagnosis and repair planning in real
applications is also emphasized by Pepper and Kahn [87].
Also related, although to a lesser extent, is work by Rushby
and Crow [91] who formalize reconfiguration, a form of re-
pair, using an extension of Reiter’s [87] theory of diagnosis.
In GDD, we use goals to focus on repair-worthy issues. In the
goal-level, we use GDD rules to resolve direct interactions
between goals; indirect interaction between goals is resolved
by the accompanying planner.
In exploratory-corrective domains, actions are often neces-
sary to obtain diagnostic information. While this is also true
of many other domains, sequential diagnostic frameworks of-
ten take a simplistic view of information acquisition. Often
what is considered is the potential, or expected, discriminatory
power of a given piece of information. The potential ramifi-
cations of diagnostic activity, even on the very condition it is
aimed at diagnosing, are often not considered; most models
assume costless questions, or at best attach a simple cost to
each piece of information. However, rather than worrying
about these issues, research in diagnosis can simply rely on
planning research which, studying these issues extensively,
should come handy. Goals, the architectural duty of the GDD
reasoner, serve as a natural interface with an accompanying
planner.
2.2 AMORD
AMORD [deKleer et al., 77] is a general purpose prob-
lem solver which is accompanied with truth-maintenance and
planning facilities. The main thesis behind AMORD’s rea-
soning component is that combinatorial forward-chaining can
be avoided via meta-reasoning, i.e. if the problem solver
reasons explicitly about its reasoning strategy. In particu-
lar, AMORD’s reasoner posts inference goals, distinct from
those posted to its planner, which are used to control reason-
ing. GDD shares this intuition. The key to the differences
between AMORD’s reasoner and GDD’s are the distinct ob-
jectives of their matrix systems: AMORD’s objective is to
control reasoning, whereas in the ECM architecture our pur-
pose is to control actions. Thus, the goals posted by GDD
serve none of its own purposes but are rather aimed at the plan-
ner. Although some of GDD’s goals are aimed at knowledge,
knowledge goals are only encoded when action is required.
In the ECM architecture, GDD is used to explicitly encode
local strategies, and goal-level interaction between strategies.
Most of the mediation and coordination between a number
of concurrently pursued strategies is done by the planner im-
plicitly, i.e. on the fly, as the diagnosis-and-repair session
proceeds, based on general principles [Rymon, 93].
3 Goal-Directed Diagnostic Framework
Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) begins with the pointof view
that diagnosis is only worthwhile if it has the potential to
affect future decisions. Thus, while we accept the common
definition of a diagnosis as a case characterization, we believe
that different purposes can lead to different characterizations
of the same situation. For example, different purposes may
lead to different refinement efforts. GDD allows explicit
encoding of purposes, which it uses to guide its problem
solving. More specifically, throughout a problem solving
session, the GDD reasoner will maintain both a belief – a
description of the current characterization, and an attitude
– encoding a sense of purpose by pointing to goals worth
pursuing.
In a recurrent cycle, the GDD reasoner takes as input a
diagnostic problem, characterized by (1) observations; and
(2) mappings (rules) from from observations to conclusions
(belief), and from observations and conclusions to goals (at-
titude). A solution to such problem is a new attitude-belief
assignment. Goals, propositions regarded as relevant by the
current attitude, are the addressed by the accompanying plan-
ner and served by the actor (the physician in our case). New
observations result in a modified diagnostic problem, and a
new cycle is initiated.
In this section, we describe a rule-based language for speci-
fying diagnostic problems in GDD a corresponding inference
scheme.
3.1 Underlying framework: Multi-valued logics
Multi-Valued Logics (MVL) [Ginsberg, 88] is a formal frame-
work for inference in which each proposition is assigned not
only a truth value, corresponding to the strength of belief in
that proposition being true or false, but also a knowledge as-
sessment, measuring roughly the amount of knowledge used
to derive such belief. Bilattices, in which one partial order
(
t
) corresponds to the truthfulness measure and the other
(
k
) to the knowledge one, are used in MVL as domains for
truth-value assignment. Bilattice values are then combined
along the truthfulness dimension using the regular  and 
operators (join and meet of the 
t
lattice). The   operator
(join in the 
k
lattice) can be used to combine knowledge
sources. Figure 2 depicts the smallest non-trivial bilattice,
with four points: True, False, Unknown, and (representing
the presence of contradictory evidence).
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Figure 2: Basic Truth-Knowledge Bilattice
We have first formalized GDD using a three-valued logic:
true, false and unknown [Rymon et al., 91]. The MVL refor-
mulation buys us expressive flexibility (e.g. by extending the
domain bilattices with default values). To fit our needs, we
have specialized MVL to a rule-based representation; Gins-
berg’s original formulation uses a full first-order logic, and
thus requires an underlying theorem prover. While the mate-
rial presented here is self-contained, the reader is referred to
[Ginsberg, 88] for a more complete coverage of MVL.
3.2 Attitude and belief
During the diagnostic process, the GDD reasoner will main-
tain and update an attitude and a belief for propositional state-
ments. To remain general, propositions may be any fact
about the patient or the world that the reasoner may know
to hold, may know not to hold, may assume, may want to
know whether hold, may want to achieve, may be confused
about, etc. The reasoner’s attitude towards and/or belief in a
given proposition will change over time as a result of new in-
formation becoming available, new inferences drawn, activity
carried out, etc.
In GDD, each proposition is assigned a value drawn from
the cross product of two (possibly distinct) bilattices: one
representing belief, the other attitude (or desire). The notion of
belief is interpreted regularly, whereas the attitude component
represents problem-solving control information and measures
the relevance of acquiring information about, or achieving
the condition described by, the particular proposition. The
belief bilattice still has the truthfulness and knowledge partial
orders; the attitude bilattice has relevance (
r
) and knowledge
dimensions.
Definition 3.1 Attitude and Belief
Given a set of primitivepropositionsH def fh
i
g
n
i 1, an attitude
maps H to an attitude bilatticeB
A
; a belief maps H to a belief
bilattice B
B
. An attitude-belief combines the two mapping
H to B
A
 B
B
. Conversely, an attitude-belief can also be
viewed as a pair h 
A
  
B
i of attitude and belief functions.
Although not necessarily so, for the purpose of this pa-
per we shall assume that both B
A
and B
B
are 4-point bilat-
tices. The belief bilattice, following Ginsberg’s suggestion,
is defined by the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the at-
titude bilattice, the truth partial order is replaced with a rel-
evance measure. Notably, one’s knowledge with respect to
the truthfulness of a proposition need not equal, in general,
one’s knowledge with respect to the relevance of that same
proposition. Technically, our attitude bilattice is made of
Relevant, Irrelevant, Unknown, and  values. Extensions
to more complex bilattices are discussed in [Ginsberg, 88;
Rymon, 93]
3.3 Goals
Goalhood is a semantic interpretation of an attitude-belief
assignment. Generally speaking, a proposition p is a goal
if its attitude assignment is highly relevant (in our bilattice
if  
A
p=R). Of course, not every relevant proposition is an
operational goal. If  
B
p=T, for example, then we believe
p holds and may want to consider it “achieved”. (in more
complex bilattices, one has to define which combinations of
relevance and achievement levels need be addressed, in what
order of preference, etc.)
The GDD inference, we should note, is purely syntactic
and is thus indifferent to these semantic subtleties; within the
ECM architecture, it is the planner’s role to decide which
goals to pursue. However, we wish to note here a potential
distinction that is based on whether a proposition denotes a
diagnostic (knowledge) goal or a therapeutic (state achieving)
one, namely that while a diagnostic goal may often be regarded
satisfied whenever the proposition is proved either true or
false, we may want to actually achieve (i.e.  
B
p=T) a
therapeutic one.
3.4 Representation
We use rules to represent knowledge. Two types of rules
are used: one for inferring belief, the other for inferring atti-
tude (goals). Antecedents in both types of rules are stated in
belief terms. A rule’s consequent (header) must be either a
proposition p or its negation p.
Definition 3.2 Rules
1. Evidential rules are used to infer belief. For example,
the following rule concludes whether a patient’s shock is
due to abdominal bleeding:
Shock 
Single wound to upper chest 
unless(Pericardial Tamponade) 
unless(Massive Hemothorax) 
unless(Tension Pneumothorax)
Shock of possible abdominal origin
2. Goal Setting rules are used to infer attitude. For example,
the following rule concludes whether it is relevant to
know whether a patient has hematuria:
Gunshot wound to abdomen 
Bullet in abdomen
 Hematuria
A proposition p can head a number of goal-setting and
evidential rules. In particular, a goal-setting rule headed by
p reflects that it is worth to pursue knowledge about p, or
the state described by p, depending on whether p is semanti-
cally used as a diagnostic or repair goal. An evidential rule
headed by p is used to conclude whether or not it holds, or put
differently whether or not it has been satisfied.
Example 3.3 Consider the diagnosis and repair of a peri-
cardial tamponade2. Throughout that process, the following
diagnostic and therapeutic goals are instantiated, addressed,
and satisfied:
1. Setting a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
(   )  Pericardial Tamponade
"It is necessary to know if the problem exists".
2. Satisfying a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
(   )  Pericardial Tamponade
"Conclude that the problem exists".
3. Setting a Therapeutic goal:
(   )  Relieve pressure pericardial sac
"It is necessary to address the problem".
4. Satisfying a Therapeutic Goal:
(   )  Relieve pressure pericardial sac
"The problem has been successfully addressed".
While rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their
antecedents expressed solely in belief terms, it may often be
useful to predicate goalhood of one proposition on the rele-
vance (or irrelevance) of another goal. To facilitate this within
a belief-based antecedent calculus, we added a mapping (atti-
tude) from the attitude bilattice to the belief bilattice, roughly
modeling the belief in the relevance of a given proposition.
Definition 3.4 A Diagnostic Problem
A diagnostic problem is a quadruple
P
def
 hH,RB,M0,OBSi such that:
 H=fh1 h2     hng is a set of propositions;
 RB is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules;
 M0 	H is a set of observations;
 OBS : M0 
 BB, is a partial belief function.
2A condition in which blood fills the pericardial sac, interfering
with the heart’s operation.
3.5 Solving a diagnostic problem
Solving a diagnostic problem requires computing the inferen-
tial closure of the observations, given the rules. Our closure
definition is based on Ginsberg’s, and can be viewed as its
simplification to the rule-based case.
Definition 3.5 Inferential Closure
An attitude-belief h 
A
  
B
i is an inferential closure for a
problem instance P iff
1. It coincides with OBS, i.e  hM0  B(h)=OBS(h);
2. For any proposition dH–M0, let fRigk
i 1 be all the
evidential rules with d in their header, fR
i
g
l
i 1 all those
with d in their header, then
 
B
d 
k
X
i 1
 
 
B
bodyR
i
  U   
l
X
i 1
 
 
B
bodyR
i
  U ;
Where   
B
bodyR represents the belief term obtained
from the conjunction of antecedents of the rule R.
3. Similarly, for any proposition dH, let fR
i
g
k
i 1 be all
the goal-setting rules with d in their header, fR
i
g
l
i 1 all
those with d in their header, then
 
A
d  attitude
1

k
X
i 1
 
 
B
bodyR
i
  U   
l
X
i 1
 
 
B
bodyR
i
  U ;
Essentially, all rules for a proposition and against it are
weighted as individual knowledge sources, and thus com-
bined using the  operator. The correspondence between this
formulation and Ginsberg’s is that there all proofs for a given
statement have to be weighted whereas here the only proofs
are the specific rules. Even with this limited scope, we should
note that in general there is no guarantee that such inferential
closure is unique, computable, or even exists. However, the
following straightforward algorithm has worked for us so far:
Algorithm 3.6 Computing an Inferential Closure
1. Start off with the observations, by setting
 
A
(h) def U , for all hH
 
B
(h) def
 
OBSh h M0
U otherwise
2. Forward-chain on the rules, enforcing conditions 2 and
3 above, until reaching a fixed point.
The formal definition of a solution in the GDD framework
emphasizes its distinction from other diagnostic frameworks.
Definition 3.7 A Diagnosis
Let h 
A
  
B
i be the inferential closure for a problem in-
stance P, then  
B
is a diagnosis for P.
Most formalizations of diagnosis take a diagnosis as their
solution. In GDD, however, we associate more importance
with the goals (and consequently the actions) adopted during
the diagnosis process. In the ECM architecture, solving the
current diagnostic problem has an operational purpose: it
defines the goals to be pursued next by the planner.
Definition 3.8 A Solution to a Diagnostic Problem
A solution to a diagnostic problem P is the complete infer-
ential closure.
4 The Diagnosis-and-Repair Process
So far, we have described how a single diagnostic problem is
defined, and how it is solved to produce a new set of goals and
conclusions. In this section, we describe how GDD is used,
in conjunction with the ECM’s planner, to produce desirable
management plans.
4.1 The ECM algorithm: integrating diagnostic
reasoning and planning
Algorithm 4.1 calls the diagnostic reasoner whenever new ev-
idence defines a new diagnostic problem. The solution, par-
ticularly the relevant goals, guides the complementary planner
in the choice of activity which, in turn, may start a new cycle.
Algorithm 4.1 ECM Diagnosis-and-Repair Algorithm
1. Initialize h 
A
  
B
i to coincide with OBS;
2. Compute an inferential closure for h 
A
  
B
i;
3. Construct a plan P for the combination of goals indicated
by that closure;
4. Unless P is empty do
 Execute P until new evidence arrives;
 Update h 
A
  
B
i to reflect this evidence;
 Go to step 2.
Note that the termination criterion is not necessarily related
to the concreteness of the working diagnosis. The process
terminates when the plan is empty, i.e. when all goals have
been addressed, or no means are available for addressing
remaining goals, etc.
4.2 Mediating between local strategies
The decomposition of reasoning in the ECM architecture sug-
gests a way to encode strategies, appropriate responses to
anticipated situations, in it. We do that by using GDD to
explicitly encode local strategies, and using planning to im-
plicitly merge (on-line) a patient-specific combination of such.
In particular,
 In the trauma management domain, strategies can be
localized around diagnosis and/or treatment of a single
problem, or of a common combination of problems. The
rules abstracted in Example 3.3, for instance, can be
viewed as part of a strategy for diagnosis and treatment
of a pericardial tamponade: pursuing the knowledge goal
Pericardial Tamponade established in (1) would hope-
fully result in a state in which it is concluded whether or
not it holds (2), and so on. Strategies can be described as
sequences, or more generally as directed acyclic graphs
(for instance when there are multiple alternatives to pur-
sue a goal or when there are a number of alternative
outcomes).
 Managing a given patient may require merging a number
of strategies, e.g. for multiple problems. In merging
local strategies, we must reason about potentially adverse
interactions, and may wish to take advantage of potential
synergies. In the ECM architecture, interaction between
strategies is resolved in two levels: the goal level and
the action level.
Most of the interaction between strategies must be re-
solved in the action level. Briefly, given a combination
of goals stemming from multiple strategies, the planner
has to choose a combination of actions and order them
respectively. In our formulation, a number of alterna-
tive procedures (action sequences) can be indicated for
each goal. Each of these has its advantages and disad-
vantages depending on the patient’s state, available re-
sources, other problems, etc. The potential for synergy
comes from the fact that often times a procedure can serve
a number of goals at once. Our selection-and-ordering
planning algorithm [Rymon, 93] uses domain consid-
erations (prioritization principles, constraints, etc.) to
construct a plan that synergetically combines the multi-
ple strategies.
Certain interactions can be resolved in the goal level
without having to consider particular choices of action.
Specifically, goal-setting rules can be used to suppress,
inhibit, or prioritize strategies or parts thereof. For exam-
ple, the following rule asserts that, in unstable patients,
the pursuit of a tension pneumothorax has a higher pri-
ority than that of a pericardial tamponade:
Shock 
relevant(Tension Pneumothorax) 
known(Tension Pneumothorax) 
  Pericardial Tamponade
Resolving interaction in the goal level may be advan-
tageous in some situations given the combinatorics of
planning, and disadvantageous in others given that it has
to be encoded explicitly in GDD rules.
Finally, we wish to note that, for engineering purposes, ab-
stract versions (templates) of commonly used local strategies
can be stored in a library and instantiated when appropriate.
In [Rymon, 93] we present some commonly used strategies,
as well as strategies that mix diagnosis and repair in a variety
of intriguing ways.
4.3 Example
To illustrate multiple cycles in the ECM architecture, we next
follow limited aspects of a case from the initial observations
and the suspected diagnosis, to its validation, treatment, and
effectiveness verification.
Consider a patient presenting in the emergency room in
stable condition, suffering a gunshot wound to the left chest.
A new diagnostic problem is instantiated with these obser-
vations. Let h 
A
  
B
i denote the system’s current attitude-
belief. Initially 
A
(h)= 
B
(h)=U, for all propositionshH. As
soon as the observations are reported,  
B
is set accordingly.
Next, the closure of h 
A
  
B
i is computed. In particular, we
use the following goal-setting rule to set the diagnostic goal
of knowing whether or not the patient suffers a hemothorax 3.
(1) Chest Wound(Left)
Simple Hemothorax(Left)
At this point, control is transferred to the planner which
recommends a chest X-ray as a diagnostic means. In the
3A condition reflecting internal bleeding in the chest cavity.
presence of other problems, the planner will have to order the
X-ray with respect to actions aimed at other needs. Different
means may be selected if more efficient given the combination
of goals.
Suppose the physician orders an X-ray and reports signs
of hemothorax and fractured ribs. Each of these findings
will then be updated in the system’s belief, and may trigger
further investigation. The hemothorax finding will trigger the
following evidential rule:
(2) X ray shows Simple Hemothorax(Left)
Simple Hemothorax(Left)
The system thus updates  
B
(Simple Hemothorax(Left))
from U to T. That change may be interpreted as a satisfac-
tion of the diagnostic goal set by (1). Note too that we must
distinguisha hemothorax finding from the conditionof having
a hemothorax, since the condition can be diagnosed in other
ways, e.g. through the presence of decreased breath sounds.
The diagnosed hemothorax triggers the followinggoal-setting
rule:
(3) Simple Hemothorax(Left)
Rx Simple Hemothorax(Left)
The attitude toward this therapeutic goal is updated from U
to R. It is referred to the planner which recommends address-
ing it through the insertion of a chest tube. Then, evidence
that a chest tube has been inserted leads to another diagnostic
goal of verifying its proper placement and that it is function-
ing. In addition to these two cycles of reasoning and activity
(a subsequent X-ray is required to check proper placement),
the following rule is evaluated to check that the original ther-
apeutic goal is actually satisfied:
(4) Chest tube misplaced(Left) 
Chest tube is functioning(Left)
Chest tube is draining blood(Left)
Rx Simple Hemothorax(Left)
In summary, the hemothorax condition is tracked from
the initial wound report, through its investigation, diagnosis,
treatment, and verification.
5 Summary
We presented a formalization of Goal-Directed Diagnosis
(GDD), and have briefly described its use within the ECM
framework. In the ECM architecture, GDD is used to post
both diagnostic and therapeutic goals to an accompanying
planner. The planner is used to mediate between multiple
needs. Importantly, assuming that diagnosis is only worth-
while to the extent that it can affect repair decisions, GDD
focuses on recommendations (goals), rather than on explana-
tory characterization. Goals are also convenient as a natural
interface with the planner.
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